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Abstract The american energy revolution is depressing oil prices and disrupting 
global energy flows. The surge in shale gas and tight oil production will most prob-
ably help american energy imports and exports to come into balance within the next 
decade. The energy revolution has increased american self-reliance and strengthened 
uS energy security, while record-low energy prices have boosted its competitive edge, 
especially over Europe. Moreover, diminishing oil imports are providing fertile ground 
for a revolution in the uS’s Middle Eastern policy, leading to a more independent and 
less engaging american role in the region. while the resulting security vacuum is hurt-
ing Europe, the increasingly shared regional interests may lead to enhanced coopera-
tion between the uS, the Eu and China.
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Introduction
The american energy revolution has radically transformed the uS energy landscape in 
less than a decade. Surging energy production is increasing uS energy self-sufficiency, 
the holy grail of american energy policy for over 40 years. The uS economy appears 
to be the biggest winner in the new energy reality. The surge in uS competitiveness 
presents an almost insurmountable challenge for important parts of European industry. 
Yet, is the uS, in the wake of diminishing reliance on foreign oil, redefining its role in 
the oil-rich and conflict-ridden Middle East, causing a uS foreign policy revolution in the 
region? and is Europe on the winning or losing side of this new Middle Eastern reality?
in this article i describe the american energy revolution and argue that, despite grow-
ing energy self-sufficiency, the uS will remain deeply integrated in the global energy 
markets. The american energy bonanza will thus continue to have a significant, though 
not revolutionary effect on the global energy landscape. i also argue that, despite the 
official uS rhetoric, the american energy revolution is causing a somewhat revolutionary 
shift in the uS’s Middle Eastern policy. The uS’s diminishing energy imports seem to be 
contributing to a less engaging role for the country in the region. The lack of determined 
american leadership to end the conflicts in Syria and iraq is also resulting in the Euro-
pean refugee crisis. without decisive action, the Eu is likely to stay on the losing side 
of the american energy revolution on the Middle Eastern and economic front, at least 
compared to the uS.
The second American revolution
The uS Energy information administration (uS Eia) predicts that the uS could be 
energy self-sufficient by the end of the next decade (uS Eia 2015a),1 more than half a 
century after president nixon presented his vision of the country’s energy independ-
ence in november 1973, amidst the devastating arab oil embargo.2 paradoxically, the 
vision held by the architect of the rapprochement with China and détente between the 
uS and the Soviet union will only become reality long after the Soviet union’s collapse 
and China’s rise to global prominence.
although every successive uS president has repeated nixon’s call for energy inde-
pendence, the solution has not come from the white House and has had little to do with 
government planners. The american energy revolution started at Barnett Shale, Texas, 
as the result of a technical innovation driven by the entrepreneurial ingenuity of George 
Mitchell and Larry nichols (Yergin 2012). The combination of advanced hydraulic frac-
turing, also known as fracking, and horizontal drilling unlocked previously inaccessible 
1 The Eia’s reference case predicts the balancing of uS energy imports and exports in 2028 (uS Eia 
2015a).
2 The biggest energy crisis of modern times was caused by the oil embargo imposed upon israel’s allies 
during the Yom Kippur war.
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natural gas trapped within shale formations, and triggered the shale gas revolution. 
Making shale gas production commercially viable, this technological breakthrough soon 
affected tight oil as well, paving the way for its expansion. Since then, these techniques 
have evolved substantially, decreasing the environmental impact of fracking and 
improving cost efficiency. as a result, the uS witnessed an almost sevenfold increase in 
shale gas production between 2007 and 2014 (uS Eia 2014c). in 2013, shale gas 
already formed the largest share of uS natural gas production (uS Eia 2014b). a year 
later, the uS produced over 728 billion cubic metres of natural gas (Bp plc 2015a), sur-
passing Gazprom’s total production by more than 60 % (Gazprom 2015).3 Tight oil pro-
duction, on the other hand, has helped to reverse the trend of declining oil production 
which had plagued the uS from 1985 to 2008 (uS Eia 2015c). in 2014, uS oil produc-
tion reached 11.6 million barrels per day (Bp plc 2015a), an all-time high. in the same 
year, the uS became the world’s biggest oil and natural gas producer, and it is expected 
to stay ahead of russia and Saudi arabia until at least 2035 (Bp plc 2015b). The surge 
in north american energy production is also a consequence of Canada’s energy revolu-
tion, which is being driven by expanding oil production from oil sands, another uncon-
ventional resource.4 as a result, Canada is likely to remain the largest supplier of 
petroleum products to the uS, well ahead of Saudi arabia. although the recent period of 
low oil prices has presented the young tight oil industry with the greatest challenge so 
far, the industry’s core appears resilient. The shale gas industry, too, is showing an 
unparalleled ability to absorb shocks, with uS gas production also increasing in 2015 
(international Energy agency 2015). The energy revolution is therefore real and here to 
stay.
Squeezing the shale, oiling the market
uS shale gas and tight oil developments have caused seismic shifts in both the domes-
tic and global energy landscapes. at home, the implications of the shale boom have 
been revolutionary. The surge in energy production, in combination with only modest 
growth in energy consumption, has significantly reduced american reliance on energy 
imports. The uS Eia predicts that the uS will become a net natural gas exporter by 
2017, while net imports of crude oil and petroleum products will fall to 17 % of the total 
supply by 2040 (uS Eia 2015a).
The gradual balancing of energy imports and exports is considerably improving the 
american security of supply. However, since oil is priced internationally, the uS remains 
exposed to oil price fluctuations despite falling net oil imports. The uS also continues 
to be deeply integrated in the global energy markets because of its increasing energy 
3 in 2014, Gazprom’s natural gas production reached 443.9 billion cubic metres, accounting for 69 % of total 
russian production (Gazprom 2015).
4 oil sands are a mixture of sand, water, clay and bitumen. Bitumen is oil that is too heavy or thick to flow or 
be pumped without being diluted or heated.
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exports. in spite of exploding oil production, the uS is unlikely to become a price-taker 
in an expanding international oil market.
The implications of the uS energy revolution for the global energy landscape are sig-
nificant, though not revolutionary. Less than a decade ago, the uS was expected to 
become one of the world’s largest importers of liquefied natural gas (LnG) due to its 
declining natural gas production. Today, however, the uS is on the way to becoming a 
major LnG exporter. as a result, Qatari and other LnG cargoes are finding their way to 
Europe and asia instead.
More importantly, the diminishing uS thirst for imported oil is putting considerable 
downward pressure on global oil prices. Expanding north american oil production 
has contributed to excess supply, triggering the plunge in oil prices in mid-2014. it is 
expected, however, that China will continue to drive global oil demand, thus offsetting 
the effects of falling uS oil imports.
Winners and losers
The uS economy has felt the most immediate and profound consequences of the 
american energy revolution. record-low energy prices have boosted uS competitive-
ness and hence substantially contributed to the economic recovery. The expansion of 
the natural gas supply alone slashed uS natural gas prices by more than half from 2007 
to 2013, generating an annual surplus of $48 billion for uS consumers and produc-
ers (Hausman and Kellogg 2015). Besides the millions of jobs created by the booming 
energy industry, many more have been added in the manufacturing, chemical and other 
energy-intensive industries (iHS 2013). Falling energy prices have helped the uS to 
emerge as the developed world’s lowest-cost major manufacturing location (Boston 
Consulting Group 2014).
Diminishing energy imports have also contributed to lower uS trade deficits, with the 
2014 petroleum deficit hitting the lowest point since 2004 (uS Census Bureau 2015). 
Moreover, uS energy has become cleaner due to the massive switch from coal to 
cheaper and cleaner natural gas in electricity generation.5 as a result, natural gas over-
took coal in uS electricity generation for the first time in history in april 2015 (uS Eia 
2015b). The advent of shale gas has therefore made the uS economy significantly 
more competitive, resilient and, arguably, cleaner.6
Due to its impact on global oil prices, the north american energy revolution is 
expected to continue to benefit oil-importing countries as well as the global economy 
at large. The persistently low oil prices are resulting in an enormous transfer of income 
5 natural gas produces around half as much carbon dioxide as coal in energy generation.
6 although the reductions in uS emissions from 2009 to 2013 were relatively small, half of them were 
related to changes in the energy sector’s fuel mix favouring natural gas (Feng et al. 2015).
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from oil producers to oil consumers, which is predicted to boost global GDp by 0.5 % in 
2015 and 2016 (Husain et al. 2015).
as a net energy-importing region and uS competitor, Europe is feeling both the 
positive and negative effects of the north american energy surge. The Eu is already 
benefiting from the decline in asian natural gas prices, triggered by the 2014 oil slump, 
as it has made Europe increasingly attractive for LnG exporters. as a result, the Eu’s 
natural gas supplies are expected to continue to diversify, with net LnG imports pre-
dicted to almost triple by 2035 (Bp plc 2015b). increasingly competitive LnG imports 
are likely to mount additional pressure on russian natural gas prices, which have 
already suffered due to stagnant oil prices. This is good news, especially for Eastern 
Europe, which relies on costly russian imports for the majority of its natural gas supply. 
However, without further integration of the Eu energy market, including greater invest-
ment in the interconnection infrastructure, the Eu will be unable to take full advantage 
of the new energy reality.
The american energy revolution, on the other hand, continues to have a profoundly 
negative effect on European competitiveness, which has suffered substantially from the 
high price of energy compared to that in the uS. in 2014, Eu industrial gas prices were 
two to three times higher than comparable uS prices (uK Department for Energy & 
Climate Change 2015a), while prices for industrial electricity were around twice as high 
(uK Department for Energy & Climate Change 2015b). The decreasing European com-
petitiveness is encumbering an already fragile economic recovery, as Europe’s energy-
intensive industries continue to move to the uS and elsewhere. imploding indigenous 
natural gas reserves, in combination with an unwillingness to exploit shale gas, are 
making the Eu increasingly reliant on pricey natural gas imports. Stringent European 
environmental regulations, too, are adding to the widening gap in energy prices, which 
is expected to persist.
However, the biggest losers with regard to the north american energy revolution and 
lower oil prices in general are the major oil-exporting countries, including russia, Saudi 
arabia, Venezuela, nigeria and iran. Since these countries rely heavily on revenues 
from oil exports, most of them are already experiencing severe fiscal crises. The recent 
situation with iran shows that new energy dynamics are likely to give the west greater 
leverage over oil-exporters facing financial difficulties. russia, however, has so far been 
unwilling to compromise over ukraine or Syria, despite a collapsing economy resulting 
from the plunge in energy prices and western sanctions. Thanks to its vast reserve 
funds, russia will be able to weather the storm of low oil prices for a while. But faced 
with a fiscal break-even oil price of $110 per barrel (Société Générale 2015) and the 
prospect of stagnating oil prices, russia is unlikely to continue with economic and politi-
cal isolation for much longer.
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Shifting sands in the Middle East
Energy, regarded as a strategic liability for the uS since the 1970s, is becoming the 
country’s strategic advantage. with the opportunity to pursue foreign policy free from 
the past constraints associated with existential oil dependence, the uS is set to gain 
greater independence and leverage in world affairs (Blackwill and o’Sullivan 2014). 
nowhere have these constraints been more apparent than in the Middle East, the epi-
centre of the world’s oil production. no country has benefited more from american oil-
driven realpolitik than Saudi arabia, the world’s swing producer and powerhouse of the 
organization of petroleum Exporting Countries (opEC).
Despite the american energy revolution, the Middle East is expected to remain the 
main driver of world oil production for the foreseeable future. any major supply disrup-
tions will therefore continue to have a significant effect on oil prices. Diminishing oil 
imports from the region will reduce american exposure to supply shocks, but the uS will 
remain vulnerable to price shocks, like the rest of the global economy.
Saudi arabia has been central to uS energy interests ever since an american com-
pany, the predecessor of Saudi aramco, struck oil in the Saudi desert in 1938.7 in the 
past few years, however, the alliance between the uS and Saudi arabia has undergone 
a profound change, becoming increasingly fractured and unequal. Thanks to the ameri-
can energy revolution, uS reliance on Saudi oil is swiftly diminishing, with petroleum 
imports down by a third from 2003 to 2014 (uS Eia 2015e).8 as the world’s largest arms 
importer, Saudi arabia, on the other hand, remains heavily dependent on the uS for 
military equipment.9 although its influence in the region and the world remains signifi-
cant, the Kingdom no longer seems to have the power to constrain uS policymaking, 
especially towards iran.
The iran nuclear deal, reached in 2015 despite ardent opposition from key ameri-
can regional allies, serves as compelling evidence that the sands are indeed shifting in 
the uS’s Middle Eastern policy. The american energy revolution seems to have played 
an important role in closing the deal in multiple ways. Besides allowing the uS greater 
freedom to pursue the deal, the north american oil surge probably helped the uS to 
convince the international community to impose the comprehensive sanctions on iran in 
2012 in the first place. These sanctions, together with the 2014 oil slump, proved crucial 
for the success of the negotiations.
as iran unleashes oil production following the lifting of sanctions, the flood of cheap 
oil is likely to continue. The gradual return of iran to the world stage is expected to 
7 The company was eventually transformed into the Saudi arabian national energy company, which holds 
the world’s largest oil reserves.
8 uS petroleum imports from Saudi arabia stood at 1.17 million barrels per day in 2014, representing 13 % 
of total uS petroleum imports (uS Eia 2015d).
9 Saudi arabia surpassed india as the world’s largest arms importer in 2014, spending over $6.4 billion 
(IHS Jane’s 360 2015).
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strengthen the islamic republic’s economic and political role in the region. iran’s rise 
will most probably accelerate the regional arms race and increase regional tensions, 
especially between iran on the one hand, and Saudi arabia and israel, the foremost 
american ally in the region, on the other. preventing an open confrontation between 
these regional superpowers will, however, require the delicate balancing of interests 
and strong uS engagement.
However, although stakes in the region have rarely been higher, the prospect of 
determined uS engagement looks more uncertain than ever. The reasons for president 
obama’s unwillingness to pursue a more assertive role in the Middle East may well go 
beyond american war fatigue and the recent economic crisis. The declining strategic 
importance of the region to the uS appears to be a worrying geopolitical reality, which 
has likely influenced the deliberations behind the uS’s ‘pivot to asia’. The untimely with-
drawal of uS troops from iraq and unwillingness to commit ground troops to bring an 
end to the so-called islamic State and the Syrian conflict may be alarming signs of a 
partial uS disengagement from the region. Since the north american oil surge has suc-
cessfully compensated for the supply disruptions caused by iranian sanctions and 
regional conflicts (uS Eia 2014a), it seems that the cost of limited engagement in the 
Middle East has never been lower for the uS.10
For the Eu, on the other hand, the price of passivity, both from the uS and itself, has 
never been higher. Millions of migrants and refugees, created by the ongoing regional 
conflicts, are finding their way to Europe, posing unprecedented challenges for Euro-
pean societies and institutions. in addition, thousands of Europeans are joining islamic 
State, raising security concerns across the Eu. without a determined initiative aimed at 
addressing the root causes of the ongoing exodus, the havoc in the region is likely to 
continue and so is the endless flow of migrants and refugees to Europe.
Growing reliance on Middle Eastern oil may, however, eventually lead to greater Chi-
nese involvement in regional affairs. Faced with the prospect of slowing growth and 
growing energy imports, China is particularly vulnerable in the event of oil market dis-
ruptions caused by regional instability. until today, China has largely been a security 
policy free rider, benefiting from wide-ranging uS security arrangements in the region, 
due to a lack of both capabilities and political will. But as China is likely to surpass the 
uS as the biggest buyer of Saudi oil as early as next year, the stakes will soon become 
too high for China to continue relying on others.
Shared american, European and Chinese interests in the security and stability of the 
region therefore represent a unique opportunity for an enhanced partnership between 
the world’s leading powers. Such a partnership would aim to prevent conflicts in this 
volatile region and safeguard the region’s waterways, especially the Strait of Hormuz.11 
10 unplanned regional oil production outages averaged 2.7 million barrels per day over 2013 and 2014 (uS 
Eia 2014a).
11 The Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil transit choke-point, is a narrow waterway connecting 
the persian Gulf with the Gulf of oman and the arabian Sea, guarded primarily by the uS Fifth Fleet.
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Similar cooperation has already proven successful in negotiating the iran nuclear deal 
and countering piracy in the Gulf of aden.
Conclusion
The implications of the american energy revolution are manifold and far-reaching. 
while the uS is a clear winner in the new energy reality, the Eu appears to be on the 
losing side, both economically and geopolitically. The advent of shale gas and tight oil 
has strengthened the security of the american energy supply, while greatly improving 
the competitiveness of the economy. The gap in energy costs between the uS and the 
Eu has rarely been wider, squeezing European manufacturers and energy-intensive 
industries. The american energy revolution should compel European policymakers 
to implement urgent measures aimed at curbing energy costs and reducing depend-
ency on imported energy. while efforts to create the European Energy union must be 
accelerated, actions encouraging environmentally responsible shale gas exploitation 
should be considered as well.
The uS’s increasing energy self-sufficiency, based on balanced energy imports and 
exports, is unlikely to isolate the uS from the global energy markets. as a major pro-
ducer, consumer, exporter and importer of energy, the uS is likely to remain deeply 
integrated in the global energy market and exposed to oil price fluctuations. The produc-
tion of vast volumes of oil in north america is expected to continue to have a significant 
effect on global energy markets, disrupting global energy flows and depressing energy 
prices. The biggest losers of the new energy reality remain the major oil exporters, 
especially those heavily dependent on oil revenues.
on the geopolitical front, there are many signs that the american energy revolution is 
giving rise to a uS foreign policy revolution in the Middle East. although energy is not 
the only driver of uS foreign policy with regard to the region, it has arguably been the 
most important one, with the possible exception of israel. The diminishing american 
reliance on Middle Eastern oil seems to have loosened the alliance with Saudi arabia, 
allowing the uS to conduct a more autonomous and less engaged foreign policy in the 
region. The new energy reality has given the uS an opportunity to strike a nuclear deal 
with iran, as well as to avoid on-the-ground engagement in the war zones of iraq and 
Syria. The Eu is, on the other hand, paying a heavy price for the security vacuum in the 
region in the form of the European refugee crisis. with the Eu unable and the uS unwill-
ing to address the root causes of the crisis, the Eu seems to be, besides the region 
itself, the key loser of the uS’s policy shift.
on the other hand, the growing Chinese dependence on Middle Eastern oil and 
increasing Eu exposure to regional conflicts are creating the conditions for enhanced 
regional cooperation between the uS, the Eu and China, rather than a confrontation 
between them. For the foreseeable future, however, determined uS leadership will 
remain essential for ensuring stability in the Middle East. Much will therefore depend on 
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the new uS administration and the ability of the Eu to prepare itself for increased com-
mitment in the region.
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